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Elizabeth	Barnes,	The	Minority	Body:	A	Theory	of	Disability	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2016)	224	pages.	ISBN:	9780198732587	(hbk).	£25.00.			[Draft.	Final	version	available	in	Journal	of	Moral	Philosophy	(2018).]		It	 is	 assumed,	 says	 Barnes,	 that	 to	 be	 disabled	 is	 to	 have	 played	 the	 natural	lottery	and	lost.	Disability	is	taken	to	be	a	tragedy:	something	that	makes	the	life	of	 those	 unlucky	 enough	 to	 be	 disabled	 necessarily,	 and	 perhaps	 significantly,	worse.	If	disabled	people	flourish	at	all,	they	do	so	in	spite,	and	never	because,	of	their	 disability.	 In	 her	 excellent	 book,	 Barnes	 challenges	 these	 assumptions	about	disability,	and	gives	a	powerful	defence	of	the	deeply	controversial	‘mere-difference’	 view	 of	 disability.	 For	 Barnes,	 then,	 to	 be	 disabled	 is	 to	 have	 a	minority	body;	it	is	not	to	have	a	body	that	is	intrinsically	worse.			 Barnes	 begins	 by	 arguing	 that	we	must	 develop	 a	 unifying,	 explanatory	account	 of	 disability,	 which	 delivers	 the	 correct	 verdict	 on	 paradigm	 cases	without	 assuming	disability	 is	 suboptimal	 (pp.10-13).	Her	definition	 is	 a	 social	one,	 though	not	 in	 the	sense	 that	all	 the	disadvantages	of	disability	are	merely	caused	by	 social	norms	and	 infrastructure.	 Indeed,	Barnes	 emphasises	 that	we	should	not	lose	track	of	the	idea	that	“whether	someone	is	disabled	ought	to	be	a	question	of	what	their	body	is	(really)	like”,	whilst	also	acknowledging	that	these	bodily	features	are	only	important	“due	to	the	way	we	think	about	bodies,	rather	than	some	objective	similarity	between	such	bodies”	(p.38).	Barnes	argues	that	those	best	placed	to	determine	which	bodies	should	be	considered	disabled,	are	disability	 activists.	 Thus,	 “disability	 just	 is	 whatever	 the	 disability	 rights	movement	is	promoting	justice	for”	(p.43).		Next,	in	chapters	2	and	3,	Barnes	develops	and	defends	her	central	claim	that	 we	 should	 adopt	 a	 ‘Value-Neutral	 Model’	 of	 disability.	 This	 is	 a	 mere-difference	view,	according	to	which	disability	is	a	neutral	feature:	one	“that’s	bad	for	 you	 with	 respect	 to	 some	 aspects	 of	 your	 life…[and]	 good	 for	 you	 with	respect	 to	other	aspects	of	your	 life”	 (p.79).	A	 frequently	 raised	concern	about	mere-difference	 views	 is	 that	 it	 surely	 cannot	 apply	 to	 all	 disabilities.	 Yet	Barnes’s	subtle	account	of	what	it	is	for	a	disability	to	be	neutral	with	respect	to	well-being	attempts	to	head	off	this	objection	by	allowing	for	most	of	the	claims	that	 an	 advocate	 of	 this	 position	 might	 push.	 Her	 mere-difference	 view,	 then,	does	not	imply	that	there	is	no	difference	in	average	well-being	between	disabled	and	 non-disabled	 people	 (in	 an	 ableist	 world);	 it	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 being	disabled	cannot	involve	the	loss	of	some	intrinsic	goods	(only	that	it	is	not	merely	this	lack);	and	it	does	not	imply	that	all	the	bad-making	features	of	disability	are	the	 result	 of	 social	 norms	 and	 infrastructure,	 as	 on	 the	 social	 model	 (even	 if	many	are).		
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Crucially,	 Barnes	 does	 not	 deny	 that	 disability	 might	 be	 a	 local	 bad,	negatively	affecting	“x’s	well-being	with	respect	to	some	feature	F,	or	some	time	
t”	 (p.80).	She	denies	only	 that	 it	 is	a	global	bad	(negatively	affecting	x’s	overall	well-being)	 and	 that	 it	 is	 (always	 and	 necessarily)	 bad	 simpliciter	 (something	that	makes	 “your	 life	 go	worse	 in	 virtue	of	 it	 specifically”,	 whatever	 its	 overall	causal	 effects	 on	 well-being	 (p.87)).	 One	 can	 accept	 this	 version	 of	 the	 mere-difference	view,	then,	whilst	also	agreeing	that	disability	can	sometimes	be	bad	for	you,	“depending	on	what	(intrinsic	or	extrinsic)	features	it	is	combined	with”,	and	that	disability	is	sometimes,	and	“perhaps	always”,	locally	bad	(p.88).		Barnes	next	considers	two	potential	objections	to	her	approach.	First,	 in	chapter	 4,	 to	 her	 reliance	 on	 the	 positive	 testimony	 of	 disabled	 people	 on	 the	basis	 that	 it	 is	 unreliable.	 Specifically,	 that	 they	 may	 simply	 be	 ‘adaptive	preferences’:	adaptations	to	the	suboptimal	in	the	face	of	limited	options.	Barnes	quickly	sets	aside	the	procedural	views	of	Jon	Elster	and	Luc	Bovens,	on	the	basis	that	they	are,	in	Elster’s	case,	over-inclusive,	demanding	conditions	of	procedural	rationality	 few	 of	 our	 preferences	meet;	 and,	 in	 Boven’s	 case,	 under-inclusive,	demanding	a	consistency	present	in	many	disabled	individuals’	preferences.	For	the	 bulk	 of	 the	 chapter,	 then,	 she	 focuses	 on	 Martha	 Nussbaum	 and	 Amartya	Sen’s	substantive	approach,	where	adaptive	preferences	“involve	both	a	change	in	preference	due	to	a	constraint	of	options	and…toward	something	suboptimal”	(p.128).	To	diagnose	disabled	individuals	preferences	and	testimony	as	adaptive,	then,	we	need	reason	to	think	disability	is	suboptimal,	and	that	it	constrains	our	options.	In	response,	Barnes	points	out	that	“we	are	all	 limited	and	constrained	by	our	bodies”	(p.132),	and	that	if	we	distrust	disabled	individuals’	preferences,	we	would	also	have	to	distrust	gay	people’s	(who	cannot	have	a	biological	child	with	a	romantic	partner)	or	men	(who	cannot	give	birth).		Second,	 Barnes	 responds	 to	 the	worry	 that	 accepting	 a	mere-difference	view	 will	 mean	 that	 it	 would	 be	 permissible	 to	 cause	 disability,	 and	impermissible	to	remove	it.	She	begins	by	considering	various	reasons	why	we	could	 not	 cause	 disability,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 a	 neutral	 feature:	 because	 it	 would	constitute	unjustified	interference	with	an	agent;	because	of	the	high	transition	costs	 of	 becoming	 disabled;	 and	 because	 we	 generally	 disapprove	 of	 changing	identity-determining	 traits	 in	 infants	 (their	 sexual	orientation,	 say)	even	 if	 this	does	not	constitute	an	autonomy	violation.	In	general,	then,	the	fact	that	causing	some	 feature	 is	 impermissible,	 need	 not	 imply	 it	 is	 sub-optimal:	 there	may	 be	some	benefits	we	should	not	cause	and,	 indeed,	some	disadvantages	we	should	not	 remove.	 More	 controversially,	 though,	 this	 leads	 Barnes	 to	 the	 conclusion	that	 “there	 is	 no	 discrepancy	 between	 the	 cases	 of	 causing	 an	 infant	 to	 be	disabled	 and	 causing	 an	 infant	 to	 be	 non-disabled”	 (p.154).	 She	 acknowledges	that	this	is	counterintuitive,	but	notes	that	this	is	unsurprising	given	the	ableist	bias	 of	 our	 intuitions.	 To	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 a	 cause/remove	 discrepancy,	 we	
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would	 need	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 constraints	 of	 disability	 are	 “somehow	
worse”	than	those	of	non-disability	(p.158).	One	way	to	ground	this	claim	might	be	to	suggest	that	being	disabled	comes	with	greater	potential	risks	than	being	non-disabled.	 Yet	 Barnes	 rejects	 this	 view,	 arguing	 that	 the	 risks	 of	 being	disabled,	 like	 the	 risks	of	being	gay,	 are	 “highly	 contingent	and	circumstantial”	(p.153),	 and	 “could	 easily	 disappear”	 (p.154)	 in	 less	 ableist	 (or	 homophobic)	societies,	and	so	should	not	ground	a	cause/remove	discrepancy	in	either	case.		Barnes’s	 arguments	 are	 nuanced,	 interesting,	 and	 in	 many	 respects	persuasive.	However,	they	give	rise	to	a	tension	that	crucially	goes	unresolved	in	the	book.	On	the	one	hand,	she	acknowledges	that	being	disabled	may	sometimes	lower	 overall	 well-being,	 that	 some	 aspects	 of	 some	 disabilities	 are	 bad-differences	 (p.75),	 and	 even	 that	 some	 specific	 disabilities	 are	 bad	 simpliciter	(p.102).	 Yet,	 on	 the	 other,	 she	 draws	 general	 conclusions	 about	 disability	 as	 a	whole:	for	example,	that	there	is	no	cause/remove	discrepancy	for	disability	per	
se.	By	including	a	diversity	of	conditions	within	a	unified	category	of	disability	it	becomes	 true	 that	 disability	 in	 this	 broad	 sense	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 bad-difference,	but	this	category	still	encompasses	conditions	(whether	few	or	many)	that	are	bad-differences.		First,	this	may	lead	us	to	wonder	whether	we	ought	to	remain	committed	to	a	unified	category	of	disability.	Why	not,	instead,	distinguish	those	disabilities,	or	 aspects	 of	 them,	 that	 are	 bad	 simpliciter	 from	 those	 that	 are	 not,	 where	 a	mere-difference	 view	may	 be	 appropriate	 for	 the	 latter	 conditions	 but	 not	 the	former?	 Further,	 it	may	 lead	 us	 to	 question	 Barnes’s	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	cause/remove	 discrepancy	 for	 disability.	 We	 can	 agree	 that	 we	 should	 not	assume	 that	 all	 disabilities	 are,	 by	 definition,	 bad-differences	 that	 warrant	removal,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 follow	 that	 we	 should	 accept	 that	 all	 disabilities	 are	mere-differences,	 and	 that	 it	 would	 be	 wrong	 to	 remove	 any	 of	 them.	 Thus,	contra	Barnes	 (p.167),	we	 can	 accept	 her	 version	 of	 the	mere-difference	 view,	yet	 still	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 sometimes	wrong	 simpliciter	 to	 cause	 a	 non-disabled	person	to	be	disabled:	if	this	particular	disability,	or	some	aspect	of	it,	 is	a	bad-difference	(whether	due	to	circumstance,	or	intrinsic	features).	A	 further	 niggle	 that	 may	 arise	 in	 reading	 Barnes’s	 book	 is	 the	 lack	 of	guidance	 regarding	what	 individuals	 are	 entitled	 to,	with	 the	 focus	 instead	 on	what	 is	 permissible.	 For	 example,	 she	 argues	 that	 the	mere-difference	 view	 is	compatible	with	offering	cures	 to	disabled	adults,	 insofar	as	 the	opportunity	 to		“determine…[our]	 own	 physicality”	 (p.163)	 is	 valuable.	 However,	 surely	 the	more	 important	 question	 is	 not	 whether	 it	 would	 be	 wrong	 for	 a	 scientist	 to	develop	a	cure	but	whether,	 if	we	are	disabled,	we	are	entitled	to	demand	that	the	government	fund	the	development	of	such	cures.	Her	discussion	of	adaptive	preferences	 is	 similarly	 light	 on	 action-guiding	 principles,	 focussing	 on	 the	problems	that	occur	if	adaptive	preferences	are	misdiagnosed.	Barnes	notes	that	
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“misapplied,	 the	 adaptive	 preference	 model	 can	 simply	 entrench	 pre-existing	bias”	(p.137),	and	considers	the	epistemic	injustice	of	unwarranted	attributions	of	 adaptive	 preferences,	 where	 this	 leads	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 views	 and	experiences	 of	 an	 already	 underrepresented	 group.	 She	 does	 not,	 however,	consider	the	harm	of	making	no	diagnoses	of	adaptive	preferences:	that	if	those	subject	to	oppression	do	not	recognise	their	own	mistreatment,	they	may	not	be	entitled	to	redress.	Indeed,	that	it	may	not	be	considered	mistreatment,	since	‘no	one	complains’.	Barnes’s	rather	negative	approach	feels	unsatisfactory,	then,	and	leaves	 us	 with	 little	 guidance	 beyond	 a	 general	 indictment	 not	 to	 assume	disabled	 people	 are	 not	 to	 be	 trusted.	 Of	 course,	 we	 should	 not,	 but,	 as	 with	anyone	else,	it	might	be	just	as	problematic	to	assume	the	reverse.	Perhaps	Barnes’s	central	aim	is	not	to	provide	guidance	on	such	specific	questions,	but	 to	make	a	wider	point.	This	 is	 that	disability	 is	not	a	 tragedy,	or	something	 “you	 should	 be	 ashamed	 of	 or	 apologetic	 about”,	 but	 is,	 instead,	 a	feature	it	“makes	sense	to	celebrate”	and	be	proud	of	(p.182).	Barnes’s	challenge	to	 the	philosophical	orthodoxy	on	 this	provides	a	hugely	 important	 conceptual	resource	for	those	who	wish	to	capture	the	experience	of	 flourishing	with	(and	not	 in	 spite	 of)	 a	 disability.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 tension	 remains	 between	acknowledging	the	diversity	of	disability	and	disabled	experience	and	the	ways	in	which	 various	 disabilities	 can	 be	 disadvantageous,	 yet	 also	 drawing	 general	conclusions	about	disability	as	a	mere-difference.	Barnes	ably	demonstrates	the	problems	with	assuming	that	disability	is,	necessarily,	a	bad-difference,	but	there	are	dangers,	too,	in	understanding	all	disability	as	a	mere-difference.	
